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Abstract
Judicial pragmatism is a judicial methodology known for its
future-looking mode of analysis, empirically-based decision making,
and openness to judicial activism. In terms of strengths, judicial
pragmatism helps to (1) maximize wealth and efficiency, (2) resolve
truly novel cases, and (3) account for legislative shortcomings. In
terms of weaknesses, judicial pragmatism poses the risks of (1)
judicial tyranny, (2) overdependence on the social sciences, and (3)
marginalization of important moral values. Although judicial
pragmatism has generally been accepted as a helpful analytical
approach, questions still remain over the extent to which it is
helpful to judges in common law adjudication, legislative
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interpretation, and constitutional interpretation. The area in
common law adjudication where judicial pragmatism offers promise
is where the facts in the case are truly novel and the application of
traditional common law rules is inefficient. In legislative
interpretation, judicial pragmatism offers promise where the
statute is vague, provides no instruction on how to interpret the
statute, and has indicia of “delegation” of lawmaking authority to
the courts. Finally, the area in constitutional interpretation where
judicial pragmatism offers promise is where the issues involve truly
novel facts and pressing social needs that are indirectly covered by
the Constitution.

I. INTRODUCTION
By the time Judge Richard Posner retired from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on September 2,
2017, he voiced many concerns about the federal judicial system in
his academic writings.1 He continued to criticize the overly “formal”
and “reactionary” tendencies of some judges when adjudicating
cases.2 In common law adjudication, for example, Judge Posner
claimed that judges too often focus on antiquated precedents and
rigid procedures instead of deciding cases based on more “sensible”
resolutions.3 Judge Posner also claimed that in constitutional
interpretation, the judiciary is too fixated on “backward-looking”
rather than “forward-looking” modes of analysis.4 In the realm of
legislative interpretation, Judge Posner contended that judges too
often defer to rigid procedures and strict readings of legislative texts
to the detriment of more sensible interpretations.5
To overcome these so-called “problems of jurisprudence,”6
Judge Posner proposed that the judiciary adopt “judicial
pragmatism.”7 In broad terms, judicial pragmatism is a
*Juris Doctor Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2019. My thanks go to
the editorial board of the John Marshall Law Review. I am especially grateful
to Editor-in-Chiefs Sean McGrath and Ruth Chan, Executive Lead Articles
Editors Sandi Tanoue and Kandace Hofer, and Lead Articles Editors Michael
Stramaglia and Chelsea Button. All views and errors of this paper are my own.
1. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: STRENGTHS AND
WEAKNESSES 21 (2017) [hereinafter POSNER, THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY]
(criticizing several aspects of the federal judicial system).
2. Id. at 54–55; Adam Liptak, An Exit Interview with Richard Posner,
Judicial
Provocateur,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
11,
2017),
www.nytimes.com/2017/09/11/us/politics/judge-richard-posnerretirement.html.
3. POSNER, THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, supra note 1, at 80.
4. Id. at 50.
5. Id.
6. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 454–55 (1990)
[hereinafter POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE] (criticizing several
aspects of modern American law).
7. Id. at 387 (stating that jurisprudence is greatly in need of a shift in
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jurisprudential approach with three core characteristics. First,
judicial pragmatism aims to decide cases in ways that would best
serve the interests of the present and future.8 Although pragmatist
judges consider history when adjudicating cases, they have no
“ethical duty” to adhere to precedent as an end in itself.9 Second,
judicial pragmatism rests on the belief that better judicial decisions
result when judges are better informed in relevant empirical
studies.10 When deciding antitrust cases, for example, pragmatist
judges look to educate themselves in economic theories before
making a final decision.11 Finally, judicial pragmatism envisions
judges as more than just rule appliers; pragmatist judges must
sometimes be “rule makers,” especially where there are gaps in the
law or glaring perversities in legislation.12
Although judicial pragmatism has generally been accepted as
a helpful analytical approach, questions still remain over the extent
to which it is helpful to judges in common law adjudication,
legislative interpretation, and constitutional interpretation. On one
hand, supporters praise judicial pragmatism’s ability to maximize
wealth and efficiency.13 Supporters also tout the approach’s ability
to handle complex factual scenarios and account for legislative
shortcomings.14 On the other hand, critics challenge judicial
pragmatism on the grounds that it promotes judicial tyranny,
unpredictability, and unintelligibly in the law.15 Critics also argue
that judicial pragmatism marginalizes important abstract values,
given its tendency to concentrate primarily on tangible factors such
as wealth.16 Furthermore, even Judge Posner expressed concerns
about the ability of judges to “analyze and absorb the theories and

direction toward pragmatic analysis).
8. Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 4
(1996) [hereinafter Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication].
9. Richard A. Posner, Legal Pragmatism Defended, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 683,
684 (2004) [hereinafter Posner, Legal Pragmatism Defended]. See also Posner,
Pragmatic Adjudication, supra note 8, at 5 (stating that pragmatist judges do
not regard the “maintenance of consistency with past decisions as an end in
itself”).
10. Posner, Legal Pragmatism Defended, supra note 9, at 684.
11. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 3
(1976) [hereinafter POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW] (stating that the antitrust field is
in need of a thorough rethinking among judges and that the essential
intellectual tool for the process of rethinking is the science of economics).
12. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, supra note 8, at 19.
13. Peter F. Lake, Posner’s Pragmatist Jurisprudence, 73 NEB. L. REV. 545,
625–27 (1994).
14. Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1653, 1658 (1990) [hereinafter Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer
Law?].
15. Amul R. Thapar & Benjamin Beaton, The Pragmatism of Interpretation:
A Review of Richard A. Posner, The Federal Judiciary, 116 MICH. L. REV. 819,
829–33 (2018).
16. Posner, Legal Pragmatism Defended, supra note 9, at 684.
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data of social science.”17 Because many judges are neither trained
nor experts in such matters, they may be unable to answer judicial
pragmatism’s call for empirically-based decision making.18
This Article attempts to contribute to this debate by arguing
that judicial pragmatism is an especially helpful tool in some areas
of the law, but not so much in others. Judicial pragmatism is
especially helpful in factually novel cases where traditional
categories of law do not neatly apply. This Article proceeds in Part
II with an overview of the core characteristics of judicial
pragmatism. Part III reviews the common strengths and weakness
of judicial pragmatism, as described in the existing body of
literature. Part IV analyzes the extent to which judicial pragmatism
is a helpful tool in common law adjudication, legislative
interpretation, and constitutional interpretation. Finally, Part V
concludes with a review of the implications of this study.

II. JUDICIAL PRAGMATISM EXPLAINED
Judicial pragmatism is associated with philosophical
pragmatism, an early 20th century American movement that
offered an unconventional approach to elicit meaning and truth.19
Philosophical pragmatism advances the view that the meaning of
doctrine is equivalent to the “practical effects or experimental
results of adhering to it.”20 If a doctrine produces useful predictions
or beneficial innovations over the long term, then the doctrine is
“true” and meaningful, according to philosophical pragmatism. 21
For example, philosophical pragmatism views science and the
scientific method as prime examples of true and meaningful
doctrine because they produce concrete, empirical, and useful
results.22
Judicial
pragmatism
similarly
values
practicality,
experimentation,
and
success-based
reasoning,
but
is
distinguishable from philosophical pragmatism in that judicial
pragmatism conceptualizes “pragmatism” in a more modern
sense.23 Rather than engaging in abstruse “philosophical hairsplitting,” judicial pragmatism focuses more on “the bottom line,”
“what works,” and the maximization of wealth and efficiency. 24 In
broad terms, judicial pragmatism is a jurisprudential approach
with three core characteristics: (1) a future-looking mode of

17. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, supra note 8, at 9.
18. Id.
19. Brian Bix, JURISPRUDENCE THEORY AND CONTEXT 282 (2015).
20. Id. at 283.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 284.
24. Id. at 284–85.
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analysis,25 (2) empirically-based decision making,26 and (3) an
openness to judicial activism. 27

A. Future-Looking Mode of Analysis
Judicial pragmatism aims to best serve “present and future
needs” when deciding cases.28 Specifically, it conceptualizes law as
an instrument that serves ongoing human needs. 29 Instead of
looking backwards to restore a preexisting equilibrium of rights in
a corrective justice sense, pragmatist judges look forward to
determine which resolutions are the most sensible. 30 Because
traditional legal forms are sometimes inapplicable in modern day
cases, pragmatist judges rely more on the facts of a present case to
determine the most sensible resolution. 31
A sensible resolution is commonly associated with wealth
maximization, according to judicial pragmatists. 32 Sensible
resolutions offer more wealth to both the parties and society. 33 Some
cases readily determine which resolution generates the most
“wealth.” For example, in cases concerning requests for a remittitur,
pragmatist judges weigh the costs and benefits of granting the
remittitur versus the costs and benefits of ordering a new trial
limited to damages.34 The more sensible resolution is the one that
provides maximum net gains.35 In other cases, by contrast, wealthmaximizing resolutions may be harder to determine. These cases
often involve considerations of intangible factors. 36 For example, in
statute of limitation cases, the tradeoff between rendering
substantive justice to the plaintiff and maintaining the law’s
certainty and predictability is difficult to balance and quantify. 37
Although cases concerning intangible factors present more
challenging tradeoff inquiries, pragmatist judges agree that

25. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, supra note 8, at 5
26. Posner, Legal Pragmatism Defended, supra note 9, at 684.
27. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, supra note 8, at 13, 19.
28. Id. at 5.
29. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, supra note 14, at 1667.
30. Id. at 1657.
31. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, supra note 8, at 7–8.
32. See Lake, supra note 13, at 623–27 (reviewing several of Judge Posner’s
works that advocate resolutions which maximize wealth).
33. Id. at 637.
34. See Davis v. Consol. Rail Corp., 788 F.2d 1260, 1267 (7th Cir. 1986)
(stating that the policy behind the device of remittitur is to provide just economy
between the litigants); Strickland v. Owens Corning, 142 F.3d 353, 360 (6th Cir.
1998) (same).
35. Id.
36. See Lake, supra note 13, at 595 (describing how issues concerning
intangibles such as the promotion of human dignity are difficult to measure for
Judge Posner and judicial pragmatists).
37. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, supra note 8, at 5.
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resolutions should focus on wealth maximization.38
Judicial pragmatism also advances the view that judges have
no “ethical duty” to adhere to legal precedents.39 Because
pragmatist judges prioritize present and future needs, they “do not
regard the maintenance of consistency with past decisions as an end
in itself.”40 To be sure, pragmatist judges still rely on the past to
determine the purpose and scope of rules.41 They also value
precedential information for the sense of direction they provide for
subsequent cases.42 But because judicial pragmatists decide cases
with an eye towards the future, they rely on historical and legal
precedents only to the extent that doing so brings about better
results in present cases.43
As a forward-looking judicial methodology, judicial
pragmatism prioritizes present and future needs when adjudicating
cases. Judicial pragmatism aims to satisfy present and future
human needs by directing judges to consider which resolution would
provide the most wealth and efficiency to both litigants and society.
Although judicial pragmatists do not entirely reject the value of
history and legal precedent, they are willing to depart from the past
if doing so best serves present and future human needs.

B. Empirically-Based Decision Making
Judicial pragmatism rests on the belief that better judicial
decisions result when judges rely on “theories and data of social
science.”44 Like philosophical pragmatism, judicial pragmatism
values scientific methods of analysis. 45 Although pragmatist judges
understand that complete objectivity is impossible in adjudication,
they still strive to be objective by deciding cases in ways that are
testable, duplicable, and backed by empirical data. 46
Studying the social sciences ensures that pragmatist judges
have a more objective understanding of the facts. Because the
search for sensible resolutions for cases requires pragmatist judges
to concentrate more on the facts than the law, an objective
understanding of the facts is essential. 47 In antitrust cases, for
example, a pragmatist judge looks to economic theories and data to
38. See Lake, supra note 13, at 550.
39. Posner, Legal Pragmatism Defended, supra note 9, at 684.
40. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, supra note 8, at 5.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 9.
45. Id. at 1.
46. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, supra note 14, at 1663–64
(noting that pragmatists persistently derive knowledge from observation and
empirical analysis); Lake, supra note 13, at 559–60 (stating that pragmatism
focuses on the continual testing and retesting of accepted truths).
47. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, supra note 8, at 5.
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help determine whether a business has restrained interstate
commerce.48 Without a firm grasp of the findings from economic
studies, judges risk making decisions that are out of touch with the
realities of the economic world.49
By contrast, judicial pragmatists are less interested in abstract
values and moral theories because, unlike scientific data, abstract
values and moral theories are often subjective and indeterminate. 50
Decisions based on abstract conceptions of moral philosophy provide
little practical use in the real world. 51 While imperfect in ensuring
objectivity, social sciences promote experimentation and
discovering solutions, and are more useful to solving real-life issues.
In cases concerning abortion laws, for example, judicial pragmatists
claim that decisions should be made less on the basis of normative
arguments.52 Instead, decisions should be reached on the basis of
the factual effects of abortion laws on women, children and the
family.53
Judicial pragmatists rely on social science theories and data to
decide cases more objectively. Because the social sciences are rooted
in empirical analysis, judges informed in social sciences are better
able to make decisions in touch with real-life modern developments.
Accordingly, judicial pragmatism relies less on abstract values and
moral theories due to their subjective and less scientific nature.

C. Judicial Activism
Pragmatist judges are more than just rule appliers; they are
sometimes “rule makers.”54 Especially when the law is ambiguous
or perverse, pragmatist judges often act as more than just “faithful
agent[s] of the legislature” and instead apply their own
interpretations of the law.55 For example, when a law is ambiguous
and the legislature fails to address the ambiguities, pragmatist
judges take it upon themselves to interpret the law in ways they
think is most sensible.56 Pragmatist judges might also look to apply

48. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 11, at 3 (stating that the science of
economics is essential to rethinking the substantive and administrative aspects
of terms such as “restraint of trade” and “monopolize”).
49. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, supra note 14, at 1667–68.
50. See Lake, supra note 13, at 624 (describing how abstract, intangible,
policy analysis is incompatible with cost-benefit analysis under judicial
pragmatism).
51. Id.
52. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, supra note 14, at 1668
(noting that legal pragmatism cannot answer the normative question whether
abortion should be restricted, but that legal pragmatism can say something
about the efficiency and consequences of such restrictions).
53. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, supra note 8, at 9.
54. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, supra note 14, at 1657.
55. Id. at 1658.
56. Id.
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their own sensible interpretations of the law when the legislature is
so “buffeted by interest groups” that the existing body of law is not
“informed by sound policy judgments.”57 Under such situations,
pragmatist judges feel justified to convert themselves from ruleappliers to rule-makers.
Pragmatic adjudication does not necessarily mean “lawless”
adjudication.58 Judicial pragmatists agree that judicial lawmaking
is secondary to the lawmaking powers of the legislature. 59 Even
Judge Posner acknowledged that judges engage in “judicial
tyranny” when judges issue orders with no basis in law and merely
based on the belief the orders will have good results. 60 But when the
law is unclear, perverse, or outright absent, pragmatic
considerations may compel judges to take action. 61 This is especially
apparent, according to judicial pragmatists, when the legislature
has been overly slow or evasive in addressing the judiciary’s
concerns.62

III. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF JUDICIAL
PRAGMATISM
Supporters and critics of judicial pragmatism have had much
to say about the pragmatic approach. The alleged strengths and
weakness of judicial pragmatism are well recorded in the existing
body of literature. In terms of strengths, judicial pragmatism is
known for (1) maximizing wealth and efficiency, (2) resolving truly
novel cases, and (3) accounting for legislative shortcomings. In
terms of weaknesses, judicial pragmatism poses the risks of (1)
judicial tyranny, (2) overdependence on the social sciences, and (3)
marginalization of important moral values.

A. Strengths
One commonly accepted strength of judicial pragmatism is its
tendency to maximize wealth and efficiency.63 According to Judge
Posner, pragmatic adjudication aims to uphold the Pareto principle,
whereby decisions are judged “Pareto superior” if they leave
someone better off and no one worse off.64 This judicial approach is
57. Id.
58. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, supra note 8, at 17.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 19.
62. POSNER, THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, supra note 1, at 414–15.
63. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 22.7 (9th ed. 2014)
[hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW] (describing how efficiency
is promoted as inefficient rules continuously get reevaluated in courts).
64. Lake, supra note 13, at 637. The Pareto concept is named after Vilfredo
Pareto who applied the principle in studies of economic efficiency and wealth
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appealing because pragmatic decisions together in the aggregate
leave society better off.65 Serving the “social welfare” is an
important policy objective, according to Judge Cardozo.66 By
contrast, decisions based on strict legal forms can be slow,
inefficient, and costly to society. 67 In contract law, for example,
formal requirements to perform under a contract may be inefficient
if breaching the contract and paying damages instead would leave
the contracting parties better off.68 The pragmatic concept of
“efficient breach” is one of many examples of pragmatic approaches
that has helped individuals maximize time, money, and
opportunities.69
Another strength of judicial pragmatism is the ability to
resolve novel cases. Because pragmatist judges emphasize facts
more than law, they are better equipped to resolve factually novel
cases where traditional legal concepts do not neatly apply. 70
Pragmatist judges find sensible resolutions for new cases by
examining the facts with help from the social sciences, rather than
by plugging those facts imperfectly into traditional legal
categories.71 For example, when underground oil reserves first
became commercially accessible, pragmatist judges looked to the
teachings of natural resources economists and oil and gas engineers
to determine the best judicial approach for deciding oil ownership. 72
Such an approach helped avoid the problems that formalist judges
faced when they struggled to associate underground oil with
traditional property-law categories, such as the doctrine of ferae
naturae.73
distribution. Id. The Pareto principle is commonly used by state planners and
economists looking to maximize the efficient use of state resources. Id. Judge
Posner cites the Pareto principle to highlight judicial pragmatism’s ability to
maximize wealth. Id.
65. Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 517 (1980).
66. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 71–72
(1921).
67. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, supra note 14, at 1656–57
(noting that formalist ideas may not serve the social welfare because it is too
backward looking rather than forward looking).
68. Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289 (7th Cir.
1985).
69. Id.
70. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, supra note 8, at 5–8. (reviewing two
example cases involving novel facts in which traditional legal categories do not
neatly apply: commercialization of underground oil and surrogate motherhood
contracts).
71. Id. at 9–10.
72. Id. at 6–7.
73. Edward Cantu, Posner’s Pragmatism and the Turn Toward Fidelity, 16
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 69, 103–04 (2012) (noting Judge Posner’s criticisms of
the use of the ferae naturae doctrine in commercial underground oil cases). The
doctrine of ferae naturae states that a wild, undomesticated animal is not
subject to a person’s absolute ownership unless that person obtains absolute
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Furthermore, judicial pragmatism accounts for legislative
shortcomings. According to Judge Posner, “American courts cannot,
if they want ‘the best results,’ leave all rulemaking to legislatures,
for that would result in legal gaps and perversities galore.”74 Legal
“gaps” in the law arise when legislation is unclear or silent as to a
relevant issue.75 Another legislative shortcoming takes place when
the legislature neglects its lawmaking duties and instead becomes
preoccupied with constituents.76 Judges might also feel compelled
to act when the legislature gives the judiciary “guidance that is
defective in one way or another, and then does nothing by way of
remedy when the problem comes to light.” 77 Under such scenarios,
according to Judge Posner, pragmatist judges have no choice but to
apply their own sensible interpretations of the law. 78

B. Weaknesses
A weakness of judicial pragmatism is that it poses the risk of
judicial tyranny. As a matter of constitutional structure, pragmatist
judges go beyond their constitutional mandate when making law or
policy.79 Pragmatist judges effectively “usurp[] the role of ‘other’
political branches” when they decide cases based not on legal forms
or precedent, but on what they think is “sensible.” 80 Such decisionmaking powers, critics claim, “drain the ability of the people,
through their elected representatives, to resolve social problems.” 81
Another danger of granting such decision-making powers to judges
is that the outcome of cases become less consistent and
predictable.82 The uniformity of the law and equal treatment of
litigants cannot be upheld, according to legal formalists, if judges
have the power to decide cases based on their sensibilities rather
than on laws fixed by precedent and legislation. 83 People across the
U.S. need a common “starting point” of the law to “coordinate and
control over the animal by, for example, capturing or killing it. Id. Judge Posner
claimed that analogizing underground oil with wild animals was improper and
formalistic. Id. He criticized cases like Hammonds v. Cent. Ky. Natural Gas Co.,
75 S.W.2d 204 (Ky. 1934) that applied the ferae naturae doctrine in commercial
underground oil cases. Id. at 103.
74. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, supra note 8, at 19.
75. See CARDOZO, supra note 66, at 14 (stating that the gap-filling role of
judges is to clear up ambiguities and discover meaning in legislative texts). An
example of a judge performing a gap-filling function is when a judge determines
the precise meaning or intent of a vaguely written statute.
76. Henry J. Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking—Judges Who Can’t and
Legislators Who Won’t, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 787, 801 (1963).
77. Id. at 792.
78. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, supra note 8, at 19–20.
79. Thapar & Beaton, supra note 15, at 826.
80. Id. at 827.
81. Id. at 833.
82. Id. at 829.
83. Id. at 832–33.
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organize their lives around shared and certain principles.”84
Another weakness of judicial pragmatism concerns the
capacity of judges to apply theories and data from social sciences.
Because most judges are neither trained nor experts in those fields,
it may be unrealistic to expect judges in each case to quickly and
accurately familiarize themselves with complex data and empirical
methods.85 A particular problem that might arise in this context is
overreliance by judges on “gut reactions” and “hunches.” 86 Judges
might, for example, select specific datasets based on intuition, even
though those datasets pose a risk of mistake and unfairness to the
parties.87 Justice Brandeis may have made such an error, according
to Judge Posner, when he attempted to study and apply economic
theories and data in some of his decisions. 88 Justice Holmes has
similarly been criticized for his decision to permit the sterilization
of the mentally handicap based on his understanding of social and
biological theories concerning eugenics.89
Another weakness of judicial pragmatism is the tendency to
marginalize important moral values. By focusing primarily on
wealth maximization and efficiency, judicial pragmatism neglects
how wealth is often unequally distributed. 90 Judicial pragmatism
helps maximize wealth in terms of absolute gains, but in terms of
relative gains, it often channels wealth to some individuals more so
than to others.91 Furthermore, with its emphasis on tangible
factors, judicial pragmatism tends to discount moral values such as
liberty, due process, and dignity. 92 For example, regarding slavery,
even pragmatists acknowledge that it follows from the concept of
wealth maximization that pragmatist judges would be inclined to
rule in favor of free labor and indentured servitude over free will,
liberty and self-determination.93 The strict “cost-benefit wealth
84. Id. at 829.
85. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, supra note 8, at 9.
86. Id.
87. Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L.
REV. 1255, 1263 (2012).
88. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, supra note 8, at 9.
89. Id.; see Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (holding that sexual
sterilization of mentally handicap inmates under Virginia law did not violate
the Constitution). This case concerned a Virginia state law which allowed for
the sexual sterilization of inmates at a mental institution in order to promote
the “health of the patient and the welfare of society.” Buck, 274 U.S. at 205. The
issue before the Supreme Court was whether the state law violated the due
process and equal protection rights of the inmates under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. Justice Holmes upheld the state law on the grounds that the
inmates’ rights were not violated because the sterilizations took place only
“after months of observation” by institution officials. Id. at 207. In addition,
Justice Holmes affirmed the value of the law in order to “prevent our being
swamped with incompetence . . . Three generations of imbeciles are enough.” Id.
90. Lake, supra note 13, at 631.
91. Id. at 631–35.
92. Id. at 595–96.
93. Id. at 631.
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maximization calculus” also might support the practice of “torture
or coercion” if it produces the desired results more efficiently. 94
Because judicial pragmatism prioritizes wealth and efficiency over
abstract values, it may support some immoral practices that
“[moralists] would find utterly reprehensive.”95

IV. JUDICIAL PRAGMATISM IN COMMON LAW
ADJUDICATION, LEGISLATIVE INTERPRETATION, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
A. Common Law Adjudication
Common law adjudication is known for its emphasis on stare
decisis and judge-made law.96 When statutes and the Constitution
are silent, the judge acts as a “living oracle of the law” by looking to
the common law for the rule that fits the case. 97 Specifically,
common law judges look to factually-similar precedent cases and
use analogical reasoning to help determine the outcome of the new
case before them.98 The factual circumstances or “type situation” of
past cases are important,99 but so is the past judge’s interpretation
of those facts under the law, history, justice, and the “mores of the
day.”100 Judges move the common law forward using both the “head
and heart.”101 Because no two cases are identical, common law
judges make new law in the sense that they apply precedent cases
to new cases, which then serve as new precedents for similarly
situated future cases.102 The accretion of case law in this manner
forms the basis by which the common law both develops and
maintains consistency,103 which is an important objective of
94. Id. at 632.
95. Id.
96. See CARDOZO, supra note 66, at 14, 18–19 (reviewing the judge-made law
process and describing how judges identify and apply rules from common law
that fit their case); Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Common Law as an Iterative
Process: A Preliminary Inquiry, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 779 (2006).
97. See CARDOZO, supra note 66, at 18–19 (citing Judge William Blackstone’s
vivid phrase).
98. See Cunningham, supra note 96, at 747–48 (describing common law as
an iterative system in which cases create legal results available for use in
succeeding cases).
99. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
402 (1960).
100. See CARDOZO, supra note 66, at 31 (reviewing some of the factors judges
consider in common law adjudication).
101. William Brennan, Reason, Passion, and “The Progress of the Law”, 10
CARDOZO L. REV. 3, 10 (1988).
102. See CARDOZO, supra note 66, at 20–21 (describing stare decisis and how
judges examine, compare, and apply past cases to make the “right and wrong of
tomorrow[’s cases]”).
103. See Cunningham, supra note 96, at 747–48 (stating that common law
is an iterative process consisting of repeated dispute resolution in discrete cases
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common law adjudication.104
The common law’s emphasis on consistency, however, does not
mean that the common law remains fixed. 105 Common law judges
“change” the law when they enter judgment in a new case not in
accordance with the ruling of a similarly situated past case. 106 The
change may be warranted because the “test of experience” may
prove that the past ruling is wrong or unjust, 107 or modern
developments in society, such as the “great inventions that
embodied the power of steam and electricity,” call for reformation. 108
If the law of precedent cases “cannot prove their worth and
strength,” then they may be “sacrificed mercilessly and thrown into
the void.”109 In this sense, the common law “works itself pure” by
correcting itself for its past mistakes. 110
1. Strengths of Judicial Pragmatism in Common Law
Adjudication
Judicial pragmatism offers several advantages if applied in
common law adjudication. First, judicial pragmatism would help
guide the oracles of common law to those precedent cases that offer
the most efficient resolutions.111 Because the factual circumstances
of a new case are never the same as those of past cases, common law
judges have room to decide which precedent cases are most
helpful.112 Here, a common law judge applying the pragmatic
approach would avoid those cases that failed to prove their worth
over the course of time in terms of efficiency and wealthmaximization.113 With no ethical duty to abide by those precedents
as an end in itself,114 a judge may throw them “into the void.” 115
Instead, the common law judge applying the pragmatic approach
forming links over time).
104. See CARDOZO, supra note 66, at 21–22 (stating that judgments in
common law have important generative power as legal precedents which serve
as the “source from which new principles or norms may spring to shape
sentences thereafter”).
105. Id. at 28.
106. Ruggero J. Aldisert, Precedent: What It Is and What It Isn’t; When Do
We Kiss It and When Do We Kill It?, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 605, 635–36 (1990).
107. CARDOZO, supra note 66, at 22–23.
108. Id. at 62.
109. Id. at 22.
110. Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A
Supply-Side Analysis, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 1551, 1552 (2003) (citing Lord
Mansfield’s famous quote describing the common law’s self-healing nature).
111. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 63, at § 22.7
(explaining the value of promoting efficiency in the law).
112. CARDOZO, supra note 66, at 23.
113. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 63, at § 22.7
(describing how efficiency is promoted as inefficient rules continuously get
reevaluated in courts).
114. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, supra note 8, at 5.
115. CARDOZO, supra note 66, at 22.
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would select the case that best serves the interests of the present
and future in terms of wealth and efficiency. 116 Given that the
common law is often criticized for developing slowly and
inefficiently, judicial pragmatism would help push the common law
forward rather than restrain it to the past. 117
Furthermore, judicial pragmatism’s reliance on the theories
and data of social science enables common law judges to determine
which precedent to apply in a new case and which precedent to avoid
or overrule.118 Because pragmatist judges study the social sciences
to ensure that they have a more objective and empirical
understanding of the facts, a common law judge applying the
pragmatic approach could better detect when a precedent case is or
is not factually on point.119 Sometimes the social sciences may
disprove factual assumptions of a precedent line of cases and call
for its redirection or demise.120 For example, in Brown v. Board of
Education, the Supreme Court overruled Plessy v. Ferguson’s
“separate but equal” doctrine after learning from social science
experiments that “separate” was inherently not “equal.”121 Other
times, the social sciences may reveal that another line of cases
previously considered unrelated actually applies to the present
case.122 For example, after realizing the inapplicability of the
traditional “ferae naturae” doctrine to commercial underground oil,
some courts shifted to applications of other property law doctrines
concerning water law, air law, and mineral law.123 By guiding
common law judges towards the most factually relevant precedents,
judicial pragmatism enhances the common law’s ability to enhance
the law and “work[] itself pure.”124

116. See Lake, supra note 13, at 623–27 (reviewing several of Judge Posner’s
works that advocate judgments which generate wealth and efficiency).
117. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 63, at § 22.7
(stating that rules get more efficient rules as inefficient rules get reevaluated
and replaced).
118. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, supra note 14, at 1663–
64 (reviewing the sequence pragmatic judges go through in common law
adjudication when deciding which rule to apply).
119. See Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, supra note 8, at 6–7 (stating in an
example how the pragmatic judge particularly studies the facts and then
decides which law would produce the best result when applied).
120. Id. at 9–12.
121. Brown v. Bd. Of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1954) (quoting Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540 (1896)).
122. Wm. E. Colby, The Law of Oil and Gas, 31 CAL. L. REV. 357, 371–72
(1943) (explaining how various property law doctrine may apply in novel
property cases).
123. Id. at 375–77 (explaining how one court applied fluid and mineral law
principles to distinguish another case that applied the ferae naturae doctrine).
124. See Zywicki, supra note 110, at 1552 (describing how a goal of common
law is to self-correct itself by amending inefficient rules).
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2. Weaknesses of Judicial Pragmatism in Common Law
Adjudication
Judicial pragmatism comes with risks if applied in the common
law context. First, a common law judge applying the pragmatic
approach might neglect precedent cases that stand for important
moral values.125 By emphasizing efficiency and wealthmaximization, judicial pragmatism undermines the common law
judge’s duty to review the law and facts of a case in accordance with
social welfare, justice, and the “heart.”126 Judicial pragmatism may
obstruct the vision of the “oracles” of the law with a set of normative
blinders. For example, a common law judge applying the pragmatic
approach would see precedent cases that best promote wealth and
efficiency, but be unable to see how the gains from applying those
cases are often unequally distributed. 127 Furthermore, a common
law judge applying the pragmatic approach might neglect the
normative values of consistency and uniformity. 128 By allowing
common law judges to select cases that best serve the interests of
the present and future in terms of efficiency and wealthmaximization, judicial pragmatism diverts judges from stare
decisis’s pursuit for historical consistency and predictability.129
Applying the pragmatic approach in common law adjudication
also poses the risk of judges misconstruing important facts. Because
common law judges are not trained experts in the social sciences,
having them study social science theories and data might actually
distort, rather than inform, their decisions. 130 Pragmatic judges
might mistakenly overestimate the differences and underestimate
the commonalities between the present and the past and, repudiate
the factual assumptions of an important line of precedent of
cases.131 Under such a scenario, judges would inappropriately
overturn important precedents and undermine the consistency and
predictability of the common law. 132 Instead of allowing the common
law to “work itself pure,” pragmatist judges who inappropriately
overrule precedent cases would make the common law less pure. 133
125. Lake, supra note 13, at 631–32.
126. See Brennan, supra note 101, at 10 (stating that a goal of common law
judges should be to move the law using both their minds and their heart);
CARDOZO, supra note 66, at 30–31.
127. Arthur A. Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About
Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 477–81 (1974).
128. Thapar & Beaton, supra note 15, at 832–33.
129. See id. at 820–21 (criticizing judicial pragmatists for discounting
precedent and creating unpredictability).
130. See Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, supra note 8, at 9 (acknowledging
that “judges are not trained to analyze and absorb the theories and data of social
science”).
131. Id.; see also id. at 17 (describing how a court mistakenly understood the
facts and misapplied preexisting rules of law).
132. Id. at 17–18.
133. See Zywicki, supra note 110, at 1552 (suggesting that the common law
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B. Legislative Interpretation
When interpreting legislation, judges have less room to work
within the “fissures” in a statute than they do in the common law. 134
Judge-made law is secondary and subordinate to legislative law. 135
Although there is no uniform, clearly established method by which
judges interpret legislation, there are several generally accepted
guiding principles.136 First, courts generally agree that statutory
interpretation begins with the plain and ordinary meaning of the
text.137 The “text should not be construed strictly” or leniently but
rather reasonably, “to contain all that it fairly means.” 138 Focusing
on the text prevents judges from letting personal and political
preferences affect their judicial decisions.139 Second, when the
meaning of the text is not clear, the judge should then consider the
legislation “in context.”140 Considering legislation in context
includes considering the intent of the legislators, the purpose of the
statute, the legislative history, and the placement of the statute
within its overall statutory scheme.141 Ultimately, the role of judges
when considering contextual factors is to fill in the “gaps” of
legislation; it is not to create new legislation altogether.142
Statutory interpretation methodology, however, has
limitations. First, the text of legislation is sometimes unclear. 143
Legislators might intentionally write the text of statutes
ambiguously and make compromises to get it ratified.144 Some
legislators might just be guilty of drafting a poorly-written
statute.145 Another challenge concerns how to balance and weigh
the contextual factors of a statute. 146 One judge, for example, might
would not be able to self-correct itself if efficient, instead of inefficient, rules get
amended).
134. CARDOZO, supra note 66, at 71.
135. Id. at 14.
136. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW 14–15 (1997).
137. The Supreme Court has begun statutory interpretation by looking to
the plain and ordinary meaning of the text in several recent cases. King v.
Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015); Hughes v. U. S., 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1775
(2018); Wis. Cent., Ltd. v. U. S., 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2070–71 (2018).
138. SCALIA, supra note 136, at 23.
139. Frank B. Cross, The Significance of Statutory Interpretative
Methodologies, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1972, 1974 (2007).
140. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2483 (2015).
141. See Cross, supra note 139, at 1972–79 (reviewing several methods of
statutory interpretation).
142. CARDOZO, supra note 66, at 14.
143. See Cross, supra note 139, at 1973–74 (stating that textual uncertainty
is a reason why interpretive tools are needed).
144. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 25 (5th ed. 2015).
145. Id.
146. See Cross, supra note 139, at 1975 (stating that legislative meaning and
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place more weight on the purpose of a statute, while another judge
might focus more on legislative history.147 Because there is no
uniform methodology, judges might purposely rely on some
contextual factors more so than others for no other reason than to
support their opinions.148 They might, in Justice Scalia’s words,
“look over a crowd and pick out their friends.”149 Furthermore, the
intent or purpose of a statute may also be unclear. 150 More than one
intent or purpose may exist and the intended effect of some statutes
may be driven by immoral or corrupt motivations. 151 Lackluster
communication between the legislature and judiciary has also
hindered legislative interpretation. 152
1. Strengths of Judicial Pragmatism in Legislative
Interpretation
Interpreting legislation from a pragmatic perspective offers
several advantages. When the text of legislation is unclear, a
resolution can still be found through sensible and realistic
interpretations of the statute. 153 Judges applying the pragmatic
approach begin by considering multiple factors, including the text
of legislation, the purpose of the statute, and corresponding case law
to make a more informed decision.154 Sometimes as a practical
matter, judges might not begin their analysis with the text at all. 155
For example, in Sherman Act cases, according to Judge Posner,
some judges do not analyze a challenged practice by first comparing
the practice with the language of the Act and then move on to
analyze the case law.156 Rather, they often start with the case law
and may never return to the statutory language—to “restrain trade
or commerce” or to “attempt or conspire to monopolize.”157 Judge
Posner accepts this approach in statutory interpretation because it
is often unrealistic for judges to find a resolution through the text
alone.158 While reasonably worded on paper, a statute may
sometimes be impractical to apply in reality.159 Other times,
intent are often malleable and unprecise).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1978.
149. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 617 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
150. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 144, at 25.
151. Id.
152. Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113, 113
(1921).
153. Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and in
the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 808 (1983) [hereinafter Posner, Statutory
Interpretation].
154. Id. at 807–10.
155. Id. at 808.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 808–09.
159. Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 153, at 808–09.
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literally reading a statute may lead to absurd results and, therefore,
justify a more sensible interpretation.160
Interpreting legislation from a pragmatic perspective would
also allow judges to take necessary action where the legislature has
been slow or silent.161 When the legislature does nothing to rectify
old statutes that struggle with modern application, a pragmatic
judge might “update” the statute to “fit the modern applications
that were unforeseen . . . by the enacting Congress.”162 For example,
when Title VII was enacted in 1964, the term “sex” meant “man” or
“woman,” and the legislation did not mention “sexual
orientation.”163 But now the language of Title VII has been updated
by judges to include “sexual orientation” within the definition of
“sex.”164 Updated interpretations are more in tune with present
needs and understandings and not restrained by an unchanging
commitment to history.165 When the legislature provides defective
or no instructions on how to interpret a statute, waiting for the
legislature to provide guidance would be inefficient and costly. 166
In such a situation, pragmatic judges would rectify the deficiencies
by applying their own sensible interpretations of the law.167
2. Weaknesses of Judicial Pragmatism in Legislative
Interpretation
Several disadvantages are associated with the pragmatic
approach to legislative interpretation. The most apparent
disadvantage is lack of judicial restraint. 168 Disparate conclusions
result when judges interpret the same statute based on what they
think is sensible without adhering to the plain meaning of the
text.169 Textual interpretations restrict judges from letting their
personal views and political preferences affect their judicial
decisions.170 Binding judges to the text prevents judges from
strategically and conveniently selecting external sources of
information to support their opinions. 171 Furthermore, as a
structural matter, interpreting statutes beyond the plain meaning
160. Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the
Bench: A Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131
HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1340 (2018).
161. Id. at 1340–41.
162. Id. at 1340.
163. See, e.g., Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 353 (7th Cir.
2017) (en banc) (Posner, J., concurring) (reviewing the meaning of Title VII
when it was enacted in 1964).
164. Id. (Posner, J., concurring).
165. Id. at 352.
166. POSNER, THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, supra note 1, at 414–15.
167. Id.
168. SCALIA, supra note 136, at 41–44.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 23–25.
171. Id.
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of the text presents serious separation of powers concerns. 172 Going
against the text would violate the judiciary’s obligation to apply the
law created by legislators who represent the will and voice of the
people.173 It would be undemocratic for unelected judges to apply
their own idiosyncratic interpretations of legislation. 174
Another disadvantage of the pragmatic approach to legislative
interpretation is that the judge, by updating statutes without
legislative approval, inappropriately engages in lawmaking.175 Such
judicial activism violates the principle of separation of powers and
would lead to inconsistent and unpredictable litigation of
statutes.176 Although the weight of a statute’s historical meaning
might not be as pertinent in modern times, judges with more
flexibility to update the meaning of statutes may undermine the
uniformity of the law and equal treatment of litigants. 177 As a
prudential matter, the legitimacy and prestige of the judiciary
would then be in jeopardy.178 Moreover, judges might also
inappropriately update the law based on serious misunderstandings
of the needs and values of modern society. 179 Because many judges
are not trained experts in keeping up with social developments, 180
it may be more prudent for judges to defer updating statutes to the
legislature.

C. Constitutional Interpretation
The founding fathers of the U.S. wrote the Constitution in 1788
as the “supreme law of the land.” The Constitution aims to preserve
separation of powers between the Executive, Legislative, and
Judicial Branches,181 and to protect the individual liberties of the
people.182
Lawyers and judges frequently debate how the Constitution
should be interpreted based on four common interpretations. 183
First, originalists interpret the Constitution by focusing on the
original meaning and rights expressly stated in the text or clearly

172. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 144, at 22.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Thapar & Beaton, supra note 15, at 824–25.
176. Id. at 819–21.
177. Id. at 832–33.
178. Id. at 833.
179. See Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, supra note 8, at 9 (noting several
instances when judges made questionable judgments based on what they
thought were the social mores of their day).
180. Id.
181. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 144, at 1–3.
182. Id. at 4–6.
183. J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 6–7
(2012) (mentioning and framing the rest of the book along the four doctrines of
originalism, living constitutionalism, process theory, and pragmatism).

388

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[52:369

intended by the framers when the Constitution was written.184 The
purpose of the originalist approach is to ensure neutrality in judicial
review by requiring judges to adhere to a single, uniform
standard.185 The original meaning of the text cannot be changed
unless the Constitution gets amended.186 Second, living
constitutionalists believe the Constitution was meant to be updated
over time.187 The text can be infused with modern meanings outside
the four corners of the document to ensure that constitutional
protections remain up-to-date with modern developments.188 Third,
political process theorists interpret the Constitution by evaluating
not the substantive outcomes of legislative processes, but the
legislative process itself.189 Although “substance” and “process” are
sometimes difficult to distinguish, political process theorists believe
that judges should intervene only where certain legislative
processes are found to violate the Constitution. 190 Finally,
pragmatists interpret the Constitution by relying more on facts and
less on the text and history.191 Based on the facts, pragmatists
generally determine whether a contested law or practice is
constitutional by balancing the needs of the state with the needs of
the individual.192
1. Strengths of Judicial Pragmatism in Constitutional
Interpretation
The pragmatic approach to constitutional interpretation offers
several advantages. First, with its emphasis on facts, the pragmatic
approach is well-suited to resolve factually novel cases. 193 Because
the text and intent of the framers could not foresee everything,
applying the pragmatic approach would allow judges to determine
whether an unenumerated right is or should be protected by the
Constitution based on the facts and not on history. 194 For example,
with respect to the Second Amendment issue whether individuals
have a constitutionally protected right to possess a handgun outside
the context of militias in D.C. v. Heller, Justice Breyer applied the

184. Id. at 36–39.
185. Id. at 40–42.
186. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 144, at 18.
187. WILKINSON III, supra note 183, at 12–13.
188. Id. at 13–18.
189. Id. at 62–65.
190. Id. at 65–69.
191. Id. at 82–84; Richard A. Posner, Constitutional Law from a Pragmatic
Perspective, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 299, 299–300 (2005) [hereinafter Posner,
Constitutional Law from a Pragmatic Perspective].
192. Posner, Constitutional Law from a Pragmatic Perspective, supra note
191, at 300.
193. WILKINSON III, supra note 183, at 84–85.
194. Posner, Constitutional Law from a Pragmatic Perspective, supra note
191, at 301–02.
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pragmatic approach.195 Specifically, he weighed the facts in the case
and concluded that the factual realities of both gun violence and the
state’s interest in keeping society safe outweighed the individual’s
interest in firearm possession.196 According to Justice Breyer,
history was the “beginning” but balancing the facts provided the
“end” for the constitutional inquiry. 197 Resolving the case based on
historical analysis was troublesome because history is often
indeterminate and can be interpreted in multiple ways.198 Given the
unresolved, heated disagreements within the Court over the
historical meaning of the Second Amendment, 199 Justice Breyer’s
balancing approach would have allowed the Court to decide the
novel issue based on the empirical facts.200
Another advantage of applying the pragmatic approach to
constitutional interpretation is that it allows judges to efficiently
respond to important social issues not expressly covered by the
Constitution.201 Rather than waiting for an all but impossible
constitutional amendment, a pragmatic judge would consider
whether the issue could be resolved based on sensible
interpretations of the Constitution. 202 For example, in religious
freedom cases, the Supreme Court has applied “sensible and
realistic” interpretations of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.203 In Everson v. Bd. of Educ., the Court remarked that
it would be insensible to conclude that a state’s policy of providing
public bus fare reimbursements to students attending both Catholic
and public schools “established” the Catholic religion. 204 Similarly,
in Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, the Court stated that a
sensible reading of the Establishment Clause indicated that a state
law requiring students to read from the Bible each morning
impermissibly “established” a religion. 205 Although the
195. D. C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 689–91 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
196. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 687 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 636–38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
199. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 689–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
201. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, supra note 14, at 1664
(noting how pragmatists are interested in using constitutional text as a resource
in the fashioning of a pragmatically fashionable result). See also id. at 1667
(stating that pragmatisms would enable the Constitution to adapt to its altered
environment as society changes).
202. Id. (stating that judges need the “instrumental sense that is basic to
pragmatism” in order to adapt the Constitution to new environments).
203. Walz v. Tax Com. of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 671 (1970).
204. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947) (holding that the state’s
use of tax-raised funds to purchase bus fare for Catholic school students did not
equate to the state establishing the Catholic religion because the state did not
support only Catholic school students, given that the state also purchased bus
fare for students attending non-Catholic public schools).
205. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306–07 (1963)
(Goldberg, J., concurring) (stating that the state’s practice of requiring students
to read from the Bible each morning inhibited religious freedom, constituted
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Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses are silent as to what
activities violate religious freedom, the Court addressed important
social concerns by applying “sensible and realistic” interpretations
of the Clauses.206
2. Weaknesses of Judicial Pragmatism in Constitutional
Interpretation
The pragmatic approach comes with risks if applied in
Constitutional interpretation. First, the pragmatic approach’s
emphasis on the facts and not on history makes the approach
inconsistent and unpredictable.207 By discounting the role of
history, the approach diverges from a uniform standard that
restrains judges from improperly deciding cases in an idiosyncratic
or possibly politically-charged manner.208 The pragmatic approach’s
emphasis on balancing the facts case-by-case also limits the
precedential value of each case. 209 A Supreme Court holding
determined by balancing the unique facts of a case would provide
limited and narrow guidance to lower courts.210 Furthermore,
applying the pragmatic approach with emphasis on facts would not
be helpful if the judge actually misinterprets the facts. 211 For
example, the main weakness of Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing
approach in D.C. v. Heller was that his understanding of the facts
was difficult to verify. It was not factually certain that gun violence
in public was severe enough to warrant denial of the right to possess
handguns outside the context of militias. 212 Because judges are not
trained experts in testing factual claims under rigorous empirical
analysis, they may underestimate or overestimate some of their
factual assumptions.213
Another risk of the pragmatic approach to constitutional
interpretation is the risk of overlooking or neglecting important
moral values.214 By interpreting a provision based on what he or she
thinks is “sensible,” a pragmatist judge may consciously or
unconsciously undervalue the moral interests of others.215 For
example, in religious freedom cases, a government regulation that

state-sponsored establishment of religion, and did not fall within any “sensible”
or acceptable concept of religious accommodation).
206. Walz, 397 U.S. at 671.
207. WILKINSON III, supra note 183, at 87–97.
208. Id. at 94–97.
209. Thapar & Beaton, supra note 15, at 832–33.
210. Id.
211. Posner, Constitutional Law from a Pragmatic Perspective, supra note
191, at 302.
212. Heller, 554 U.S. at 631–34.
213. Posner, Constitutional Law from a Pragmatic Perspective, supra note
191, at 302.
214. WILKINSON III, supra note 183, at 93–94.
215. Id.
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prohibits students from reading the Bible each morning in school
might appear to some individuals like an effort to avoid
“establishing” a religion while to others it may look like an effort to
deny “free exercise.”216 Because a “sensible” reading of the First
Amendment might not be “sensible” to others, deciding the case
based on a judge’s “sensible” interpretation of the Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses might underappreciate some important
moral values.217 Deciding a case based on a judge’s “sensible”
interpretation of the Constitution might also allow judges to insert
their personal ideological views into the Constitution. 218 The judge
might replace a more appropriate interpretation of the Constitution
with his or her personal interpretation under the guise of empirical
analysis and common sense.219 Without a uniform standard to
determine what is sensible, a judge applying the pragmatic
approach could deceptively impose his or her understanding of
“common sense” onto the Constitution. 220

V.

CONCLUSION: PROMISING AREAS FOR JUDICIAL
PRAGMATISM

Judicial pragmatism is a judicial methodology known for its
future-looking mode of analysis, empirically-based decision making,
and openness to judicial activism. In terms of strengths, judicial
pragmatism helps to (1) maximize wealth and efficiency, (2) resolve
truly novel cases, and (3) account for legislative shortcomings. In
terms of weaknesses, judicial pragmatism poses the risks of (1)
judicial tyranny, (2) overdependence on the social sciences, and (3)
marginalization of important moral values. Although judicial
pragmatism has generally been accepted as a helpful analytical
approach, questions still remain over the extent to which it is
helpful to judges in common law adjudication, legislative
interpretation, and constitutional interpretation.
The area in common law adjudication where judicial
pragmatism offers much promise is where the facts are truly novel
and applying traditional common law rules is inefficient. In agency
law, for example, an agency relationship is traditionally defined in
common law as a relationship in which by mutual consent one

216. Compare Schempp, 374 U.S. at 205 (ruling that the Bible reading
requirement violated the Establishment clause), with id. at 308–09 (Stewart,
J., dissenting) (claiming that majority’s holding jeopardized the Free Exercise
Clause).
217. WILKINSON III, supra note 183, at 93–94.
218. Posner, Constitutional Law from a Pragmatic Perspective, supra note
191, at 302.
219. WILKINSON III, supra note 183, at 93–94.
220. Id. See also Posner, Constitutional Law from a Pragmatic Perspective,
supra note 191, at 302 (stating that judges wrongfully engage in policy making
when politics rather than the law guide their reasoning).
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person or entity, the agent, undertakes to act on behalf of another
person or entity, the principal, subject to the principal’s control.221
However, when applied in intellectual property in today’s
information age, the traditional definition of an agency relationship
has been troublesome and inefficient. 222 For example, the
relationship between inventors of intellectual property and users of
the intellectual property has created confusion regarding who
should be viewed as the agent and who should be viewed as the
principal.223 The designation that each party receives is crucial as a
matter of incentives and efficiency.224 For example, if the user is
designated the principal, then the inventor may have less incentive
to create new intellectual property and the efficiency of innovation
would decrease.225 Here, the pragmatic approach would offer much
help because judges would study novel facts with help from wellestablished findings from the social sciences, and then determine
the most sensible way of designating the agency relationship that
would maximize wealth and efficiency.
Furthermore,
in
legislative
interpretation,
judicial
pragmatism offers promise where the statute is vague, provides no
instruction on how to interpret the statute, and has indicia of
“delegation” of lawmaking authority to the courts. 226 For example,
in trademark law, the Lanham Act provides nationwide legal
protection for federally registered trademarks and provides
remedies for their infringement by unauthorized usage that creates
a likelihood of consumer confusion.227 The meaning of the phrase
“create a likelihood of consumer confusion” is not clear and the
legislature provided little instruction on interpretation.228 Whether
an unauthorized use of the trademark creates a likelihood of
consumer confusion has largely been “delegated” to the judge to
decide.229 If a judge applied the pragmatic approach in this context,
the judge could determine whether there is “consumer confusion”
based on sensible factual determinations made through empirical
studies.230 The judge’s actions would also not be as threatening to
the principle of separation of powers because the statute implicitly
221. A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285, 290 (Minn.
1981).
222. Richard Gruner, Intangible Inventions: Patentable Subject Matter for
an Information Age, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 355, 429 (2002).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See Gluck & Posner, supra note 160, at 1340–42 (reviewing the benefits
of avoiding absurdity, advancing common sense, and updating language when
interpreting a statute).
227. Application for registration; verification, 15 U.S.C. § 1051, et seq.,
(2012).
228. Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Balt. Football Club Ltd., 34 F.3d 410,
414 (7th Cir. 1994).
229. Id. at 414–15.
230. Id. at 414.
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“delegates” authority to the judge to decide.231 Antitrust law and the
Sherman Act is another area where it might be promising to apply
the pragmatic approach. Like the Lanham Act, the Sherman Act is
often viewed as having overly general language, little instruction
from the legislature on how to interpret it, and an indicia of
delegation of authority to the courts. 232 Sensible interpretations of
the statute and empirical findings about the realities of monopoly
power in the economy have allowed many judges to apply the
Sherman Act efficiently and in an up-to-date fashion in the modern
world.233
Finally, the area in constitutional interpretation where judicial
pragmatism offers promise is where the issue involves novel facts
and pressing social needs not expressly but indirectly covered by the
Constitution. For example, issues concerning abortion and
homosexuality have become prominent in society, and the
Constitution is silent with respect to these issues. Yet the Supreme
Court, in recognizing the sensible needs of society, has recognized
some rights in these areas in part by relying on sensible
interpretations of constitutional provisions indirectly related to the
subject matter. For example, with respect to abortion, even though
the Constitution is silent about a woman’s right to get an abortion,
the Court recognized such a right in Roe v. Wade in part by drawing
a sensible connection between abortion and the right to privacy and
liberty through the Fourteenth Amendment.234 According to Judge
Posner, such a holding would not have been reached without a
pragmatic approach to reviewing the facts concerning the practical
needs of women, families, and the state. 235
Although judicial pragmatism is not without weaknesses, it
has played an important role in many important cases. With a
better understanding of its strengths and weaknesses, the judiciary
can, according to Judge Posner, overcome many of the “problems of
jurisprudence.”236

231. Id.
232. See Gluck & Posner, supra note 160, at 1342 (stating that the Sherman
Act is a good example of a statute that is overly general and in need of updating).
233. See Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 153, at 808 (reviewing
how pragmatic judges have interpreted the Sherman Act).
234. Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should
be Overruled, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 391–92 (1992).
235. Id. at 391.
236. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 6, at 387
(stating that jurisprudence is greatly in need of pragmatic analysis).

394

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[52:369

